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Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972 is aimed at
securing equality of the sexes in the
educational context. It prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in
any educational program or activity
receiving federal funds. The statute
provides that if the government
agency that disbursed such funds
finds that the program has engaged
in sex discrimination, the agency
will terminate federal funding.
Title IX has been successfully used to
challenge inequality in scholarships,
recruiting, equipment, and facilities
for women's sports at educational
institutions, as well as to attack sexual harassment of women students in
high schools and colleges.
In Cannon v. University of Chicago,
441 U.S. 677 (1979), the Court
dealt with the question of whether
Title IX also provides (in addition to
the agency remedy of termination of
funds) an implied private cause of
action for individuals who have
been discriminated against on the
basis of sex by an educational program. The Court held that a student
who had allegedly been denied
admission to medical school

because of her sex could maintain a
cause of action under Title IX and
seek a private remedy to redress the
violation of her rights.
The rationale underlying the
Cannon decision was based on the
application of a four-part test, first
proposed in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66
(1975), for determining the circumstances for implying a private cause
of action into a federal statute that
does not expressly provide for such
enforcement. More recently, the
Supreme Court has revisited the
issue of the criteria for implying a
private right to sue in Sandoval v.
Alexander, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
The Sandoval decision arguably
constitutes a narrowing of the circumstances for importing a private
cause of action into a federal
statute. The Court eschewed
reliance on three of the four factors
enunciated in Cort, holding that legislative intent is the only basis upon
which a private right of action may
be inferred.
ISSUE
Does Title IX's ban on discrimination allow a private individual to sue
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for retaliation when a recipient of
federal funds engages in adverse
action against that individual
because of his complaints that the
recipient is violating Title IX?
FACTS
Roderick Jackson has been an
employee of the Birmingham Board
of Education (the Board) since
1993. He was employed as both a
physical education teacher and
coach of the girls basketball team.
In December 2000, Jackson began
protesting that the girls basketball
team was being denied equal funding and equal access to equipment
and facilities as compared to the
boys team. Shortly thereafter, he
began receiving negative evaluations
and, in May 2001, he was removed
as coach. Jackson continues to be
employed in his position as a
tenured physical education teacher.
Jackson filed a lawsuit against the
Board in federal district court for
the northern district of Alabama. He
alleged that the Board had retaliated
against him in violation of Title IX
because of his complaints that the
girls basketball team was receiving
unequal treatment based on sex.
The Board filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground that Title IX's implied
private cause of action as recognized in Cannon does not include
claims of retaliation.
The district court judge referred the
motion to a magistrate judge, who
recommended that the Board's
motion be granted, finding that Title
IX does not create a private cause of
action for retaliation. The district
court judge adopted the magistrate's
recommendation. Jackson appealed,
and the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the dismissal of
the complaint. Jackson v.
Birmingham Board of Education,
309 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2002).

The Eleventh Circuit viewed the
question presented as whether Title
IX implies a private cause of action
and remedy for retaliation. The
court determined that the answer to
that question was governed by the
Supreme Court's holding in
Sandoval, requiring courts to look
solely to statutory intent. The court
noted that to determine statutory
intent, it is to look to the statutory
text for "rights-creating language"
and to examine the statutory
enforcement mechanism. Only if
these two indicators are inconclusive should a court review legislative
history and the context surrounding
the passage of the statute.
Applying this criteria, the Eleventh
Circuit found that the express language of the statute does not create
a right to be protected from retaliation. "Nothing in the text indicates
any congressional concern with
retaliation that might be visited on
those who complain of Title IX violations. Indeed, the statute makes
no mention of retaliation at all."
Jackson, 309 F.3d at 1344.
Secondly, the enforcement mechanism provided by the statute (the
withdrawal of federal funds), and
the administrative requirements
that must be fulfilled before the
imposition of any penalty (attempt
at voluntary compliance, agency
hearing, congressional and judicial
review) militate against implying a
private cause of action; providing
such explicit enforcement mechanisms suggests Congress intended to
preclude other means.
While acknowledging that the
administrative regulations issued
under Title IX prohibit retaliation,
the court found such regulations
could not be the basis for implying a
private right of action. Regulatory
language cannot create a right that
Congress did not enact in the
statute, and the statutory language
clearly does not create such a right.

Jackson filed a motion for rehearing
en banc, which was denied. Jackson
then filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court,
which the Court granted. Jackson v.
BirminghamBoard of Education,
124 S.Ct. 2834 (2004).
CASE ANALYSIS
The parties' arguments in this case
are somewhat akin to ships passing
in the night. Jackson focuses his
argument on the issue of statutory
interpretation--does the term "discrimination" as used in Title IX
include the concept of "retaliation"?
The Board, on the other hand, views
the salient issue as to whether, in
light of the Sandoval case, there is
an implied private cause of action
for retaliation under Title IX.
Jackson begins his argument by
asserting that the lower court's discussion and application of Sandoval
to this case is misplaced. Sandoval
addressed the question of the criteria to apply when determining if
Congress intended a statute to be
privately enforced. The Court in
Cannon has already answered that
question with regards to Title IX in
the affirmative. Thus, the only question presented by this case is
whether Title IX's prohibition
against discrimination includes discrimination that takes the form of
retaliation.
Jackson then asserts that retaliation
is a form of discrimination-it is
conduct that treats an individual less
favorably than others because that
individual has complained about discrimination. The Court in Sullivan
v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396
U.S. 229 (1969) held that the statutory ban on discrimination encompasses retaliation. The federal statute
at issue in Sullivan by its terms prohibited "discrimination" in property
transactions; the Court held that
such prohibition included a prohibi(Continued on Page 138)
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tion against retaliation for complaining about such discrimination.
Consistent with Sullivan, the courts
of appeals have interpreted the
meaning of discrimination to
include retaliation. Neither Title VII
nor the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act expressly prohibit
retaliation against federal sector
employees who complain of discrimination, yet the courts have held
that the general prohibition against
discrimination impliedly includes a
ban on retaliation. Similarly, until
its amendment in 1992, the
Rehabilitation Act did not expressly
prohibit retaliation but the courts
interpreted its prohibition on discrimination to include retaliation.
Defining discrimination to include
retaliation does not conflict with
Title IX's requirement that discrimination be "on the basis of sex." To
retaliate against someone who complains about sex discrimination is to
take action on the basis of sex,
since sex is an underlying condition
of the complaint.
The circumstances surrounding
Title IX's enactment indicate congressional intent to prohibit retaliation. Evidence presented at congressional hearings during the consideration of Title IX included extensive
testimony and documents concerning reprisal and retaliation faced by
those who complained about sex
discrimination. Moreover, the
Sullivan case had only recently
been decided at the time Congress
pass Title IX. As the Supreme Court
noted in Cannon, it is appropriate
to assume that Congress was familiar with the Sullivan decision and
expected Title IX to be interpreted
consistently with that decision.
Failure to protect against retaliation
would undercut the congressional
purposes behind passage of Title IX.
Individuals will not be able to assert

their right to be free from sex discrimination (a right recognized in
Cannon) if they are afraid that they
will be subjected to reprisals for
asserting that right. Moreover,
Congress's goal of ensuring that federal funds are not used to finance
discriminatory practices depends in
large measure on the willingness of
individuals who observe such practices to report them. Individuals are
less likely to report such practices if
they fear retaliation as a result of
such reporting.
The implementing regulations under
Title IX have uniformly and consistently interpreted the term discrimination to include retaliation. These
regulations are entitled to deference
by this Court. The regulations were
submitted to Congress for review,
which held hearings and discussed
proposed changes. Congress, however, did not modify the regulations
and they were allowed to become
effective.
Finally, contrary to the Eleventh
Circuit's and the Board's view, there
is no basis for creating a distinction
in protecting against retaliation
between those who complain about
sex discrimination against others
and those who complain about sex
discrimination against themselves.
Such a distinction conflicts with the
Sullivan decision that protected a
white victim of retaliation based on
his complaints about discrimination
against his black tenant. The civil
rights statutes that prohibit retaliation protect all individuals who
make complaints about discrimination regardless at whom the discrimination was aimed. Moreover,
such a distinction would be difficult
to administer in practice. The work
of educators and coaches is affected
by the experiences of their students.
If students are denied access to
facilities, equipment, and resources
based on their sex, then educators
who work with such students are
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laboring under more difficult working conditions and thus are victims
of the discrimination as well.
The Board takes issue with
Jackson's characterization of the
case. This case is not solely about
defining the meaning of the term
"discrimination," but more fundamentally it is about whether the
Supreme Court should recognize a
new cause of action implied within
Title IX.
Applying the Sandoval analysis, the
sole determinant for implying rights
and remedies into any statutory
scheme is congressional intent. The
express language of Title IX does not
address retaliation. When Congress
intends to prohibit retaliation, as it
did in Title VII dealing with private
sector employees, it expressly uses
specific language prohibiting discrimination on the basis of an individual's opposition to any practice
made unlawful by the statute or on
the basis of the individual's participation in the enforcement of the
statute. In Title IX, Congress limited
its prohibition to discrimination "on
the basis of sex."
The creation of an implied remedy
also conflicts with congressional
intent. Title IX provides for an
administrative enforcement mechanism and a specific remedy for violations. By expressly providing a
means to remedy Title IX violations,
Congress intended to preclude other
mechanisms for enforcement.
The regulations cited by Jackson in
support of his retaliation claim are
beyond the scope of the agency's
authority and thus do not provide
any evidence of congressional intent
to create such a claim. Section 902
of Title IX authorized the
Department of Education to create
rules to enforce Title IX. The regulations, however, go beyond addressing enforcement issues to create a
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new cause of action. As this Court
held in Sandoval, a regulation cannot create a right that is not based
in the underlying statute.
Under the express language of Title
IX, educational programs are prohibited from discriminating on the
basis of sex. Jackson claims he was
removed from his coaching position
because he complained about practices that discriminated against the
girls basketball team. The action
taken against Jackson was not on
the basis of sex, but rather, allegedly, on the basis of his complaint.
Such a claim is not within the
express language of Title IX.
Retaliation is not mentioned anywhere in the text of the statute. To
read such a claim into the statutory
language amounts to an amendment
of Title IX, not an interpretation.
Retaliation and discrimination are
two separate legal concepts. A prohibition against discrimination neither expressly nor impliedly prohibits retaliation. Jackson's reliance
on Sullivan to support such an
implication is misplaced. Sullivan's
rationale conflicts with the Court's
later ruling in Sandoval that allows
for the recognition of implied rights
and remedies only when legislative
intent to create such rights is evident. Sullivan's more expansive
treatment for the creation of
implied rights conflicts with the
Court's more recent analysis that
reins in the scope of the implied
rights doctrine. Thus, although not
overruled, Sullivan should be limited to its facts.
The textual prohibition against "discrimination" should not be broadly
construed. Title IX was enacted
under the Spending Clause of the
Constitution; normally such statutes
are strictly construed. The general
rule requires that when Congress
places conditions on receipt of federal funds, it must do so unambigu-

ously so that the recipient of such
funds understands the limits under
which it must operate in order to
remain eligible for such funds. The
text of Title IX does not provide
such clear notice that retaliatory
action would jeopardize federal
funding.
Jackson asserts that Congress's failure to repeal Cannon's holding at
the time it amended Title IX after
the Cannon decision is evidence of
congressional acceptance that a private right of action is implied in
Title IX. Such an argument elevates
inaction to express action, a result
this Court has cautioned against.

SIGNIFICANCE
Title IX and Title VI are generally
construed consistently. Thus, any
interpretation of Title IX disallowing
protection from retaliation would
likely be applied to Title VI as well,
leaving unprotected those individuals who complain about racial or
national origin discrimination by
programs receiving federal funds.
Moreover, as many lower courts
have interpreted the term "discrimination" as used in other civil rights
statutes to include retaliation, such
interpretation would be subject to
attack should the Supreme Court
reject the argument in this case.

The regulations prohibiting retaliation are contrary to the express
terms of Title IX and are not, therefore, entitled to deference. The Court
has held that it may defer to agency
statutory interpretation as found in
administration regulations when the
text of the statute is ambiguous. Title
IX's statutory language is not
ambiguous-it clearly prohibits discrimination but makes no mention
of retaliation. Moreover, even where
a statute is ambiguous, the Court will
not defer to agency regulations if
they construe the statute in an
impermissible manner. The regulations in this case constitute such an
impermissible construction.

The failure to include claims of
retaliation within the scope of Title
IX could impact the overall efficacy
of the statute. Within the education
context (which is the focus of Title
IX's regulatory scheme), the persons
most likely to be in a position to
identify discrimination are educators and administrators, whereas
the persons most likely to be subjected to discrimination are students and minors. If the educators
and administrators are left unprotected from reprisals, many will be
deterred from "blowing the whistle"
for fear of jeopardizing their jobs
and careers. Discriminatory practices will be undetected and undeterred.

Finally, even under the regulations,
Jackson lacks standing to enforce a
retaliation claim. Jackson's complaint related to discrimination
against the girls basketball team. His
complaint did not relate to discrimination against himself on the basis
of his sex, but rather discrimination
against others on the basis of their
sex. He was not a victim of the discrimination about which he complained. Thus, any retaliation was
not on the basis of his sex, and
therefore not within the purview of
either the statute or the regulations.

On the other hand, undue expansion of the scope of Title IX leaves
funding recipients vulnerable to a
range of liability not contemplated
at the time the recipient accepted
the funds. Educational institutions
at all levels are facing financial
hardships. Although a violation of
the strictures of Title IX is not to be
condoned, the penalty foreseen by
fund recipients was loss of federal
financial assistance, not compensatory and punitive damages for
indeterminate amounts.
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PARTIES
For Roderick Jackson (Marcia D.
Greenberger (202) 588-5180)
For Birmingham Board of
Education (Keith Thomas (205)
328-7915)

AMIcUS BRIEFS
In Support of Roderick Jackson
American Bar Association
(Robert J. Grey (312) 988-5000)
Birch Bayh (John F. Cooney
(202) 344-4000)
Leadership Conference on Civil
Rights (Virginia A. Seitz (202) 7368000)
National Education Association,
et al. (Jeremiah A. Collins (202)
842-2600)
National Partnership for Women
& Families, et al. (Caroline
M. Brown (202) 662-6000)
New York Lawyers for the Public
Interest, et al. (Jeffrey A. Lamken
(202) 639-7700)
United States (Paul D. Clement,
Acting Solicitor General of the
United States (202) 514-2217)
Women's Sports Foundation, et
al. (Nancy Hogshead-Makar (904)
680-7784)
In Support of Birmingham Board of
Education
Alabama, Delaware, Hawaii,
Nevada, Oregon, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Utah, and Virginia
(Kevin C. Newsome (334) 242-7401)
Eagle Forum Education & Legal
Defense Fund (Andrew L. Schlafly
(908) 719-8608)
National School Boards
Association, et al. (Julie Underwood
(703) 838-6722)
National Wrestling Coaches
Association (Lawrence J. Joseph
(202) 669-5135)
Pacific Legal Foundation (John
H. Findley (916) 419-7111)

140

Issue No. 3

